The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was signed into law in 2002 by then U. S. President George Bush to improve port and vessel security in the United States in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The implementation of the Act and the Code of Federal Regulations promulgated from the Act started in 2004.  The MTSA made sweeping changes in U.S. maritime security that affected vessels and facilities of all sizes.  The United States Coast Guard has full responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the regulations of the Act.  Congress also established a Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) to help public agencies and private industry determine their vulnerabilities and procure security technology to improve their facility security program. 

It is estimated that the PSGP has provided close to $2.5 billion for ports and facilities to improve their operations.  However the process for agencies and private industry to receive their funding is taking over two years once the funds are awarded.  Facilities and government agencies were required to provide matching funds of up to 25% for projects until recently where the matching requirements were removed. 

The Coast Guard along with other federal agencies have completed the initial implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential or TWIC.  However they are still working to develop a standard for the electronic TWIC readers that will allow security personnel direct access to law enforcement databases and determine if the person entering the facility with the TWIC is a threat and also if the TWIC is a valid credential.  Many facilities have received grant funding for the TWIC readers, but have not purchased the readers because they are waiting for the Coast Guard approved list.

Regulations continue to become more complex for both facilities and vessels.  The Coast Guard is moving from a position of educating facilities and vessels on the regulations to enforcement of these regulations.  A number of facilities have been closed with MTSA related security issues.  Facilities should consider working with experienced MTSA consultants and security companies to help them mitigate their risk and fine/closure exposure.  There are very few security companies that can provide the security plan consulting along with the people and technology to implement the security plan.  Facilities and vessels should always check the company they hire to ensure they understand the regulations and have conducted inspections and have written plans in the past.  If a company has prior Coast Guard as part of their staff, ensure they understand the regulations, because not everyone in the Coast Guard understands or deals with MTSA.

 

Deterring Pirate Attacks Against Merchant Ships
By Corey D. Ranslem

Pirates have been sailing the seas of the world from time immemorial. What some historians call the “golden age” of piracy started in the 16th century and continued into the 18th century. Perhaps the most successful and best known of the pirate crews during that period were the Barbary Corsairs, bands of pirates who plied their trade along the Northern Coast of Africa. The Corsairs pioneered many of the tactics used by modern-day pirates. They boarded ships, stole cargo, slaughtered some crew members and held others hostage, and demanded that the Western countries pay them to provide “protection.”

Most merchant crews of that era lacked even line-of-sight communications and often did not realize their ships were under attack until it was too late. And, of course, they did not have any of the advanced technology – specifically including detection systems and devices – that would give them what today is called situational awareness. Most European countries paid protection money to the pirates so that their ships could safely move through the trading ports of the Mediterranean.

The then-fledgling U.S. government did not have the money to pay the pirates, so – after several politically embarrassing incidents — President Thomas Jefferson sent a U.S. Marine detachment to the North Coast of Africa to protect American merchant ships from pirate attacks. It was not an easy or, at first, totally successful assignment, but the Marines eventually defeated the pirates in many ports along the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, ensuring safe passage for American and European traders.

A Change in Tactics, an Increase in Numbers
Modern-day pirates usually board ships searching for money or marketable cargo. Sometimes they have been easily frightened off by alert crew members. However, their tactics have changed dramatically during the past year. Pirates from lawless areas worldwide have defiantly increased the use of force and violence against merchant ships and private yachts. They hijack ships, holding the ships and crews hostage and demanding millions of dollars in ransom payments.

A number of merchant crew members have been injured or killed during these attacks – which occur worldwide, but have been concentrated mostly off the eastern coast of Africa. It is estimated that close to $150 million in ransom money was paid in 2008 to pirates who were operating primarily in the Gulf of Aden. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that there were 293 pirate attacks against ships worldwide in 2008, compared with 263 attacks in 2007. There were 49 ship hijackings in 2008, a 200 percent increase over 2007 – again, according to the IMB — with 898 crew members taken hostage.

Most of the hijackings reported worldwide in the past several years were concentrated in the Gulf of Aden. However, many maritime-security experts, including at least some senior IMB officials, believe that the number of attacks and incidents reported represents only about one-fifth to one-third of the actual attacks that took place worldwide. Yacht crews and the owners of small cruising vessels also have reported an increase in attacks and violence against their vessels off the coasts of Central and South America; many of those attacks were not reported to the IMB.

There are very few groups of mariners who are immune to pirate attacks. Pirates can strike virtually anywhere, at any time, and against almost any target (except for armed naval vessels). In recent months various bands of pirates have been targeting large commercial vessels – e.g., container ships, bulk cargo carriers, oil and chemical tankers, and cruise ships – as well as the mega-yachts. Most pirate attacks against ships underway take place during daylight hours, but attacks against ships anchored or moored usually take place during the night. Significantly, most of the attacks that were reported had at least one thing in common: The crews of the ships being attacked did not realize they were under attack until the attack was in progress.

Unlike the crews of merchant ships in the times of the Barbary Corsairs, those who man today’s merchant ships have a variety of technologies and systems available to help improve their situational awareness. With early-warning equipment and vigilant crews, most attacks could be prevented. There are numerous types of electronic systems — long-range cameras, for example, as well as surface-search radars and access-control systems — available to diminish the pirate threat.

Vigilance, Training, and Modern Equipment
Crew vigilance and training also are essential to halting or at least diminishing the number of additional pirate attacks in the future. Unfortunately, most merchant crews are not properly trained on threat recognition, and also do not know how to cope with pirate attacks and boardings. Moreover, many vessels do not have emergency plans in place to deal with attempted attacks and boardings. However, first-hand accounts of recent pirate attacks (and attempted attacks) show that trained and prepared crews that are equipped with early-warning systems have usually been able to prevent attacks and hijackings. (The IMB does not keep statistics on how, precisely, various attacks were prevented; that information is available only by reading individual attack reports and by interviewing crew members).

Not incidentally, many if not all maritime-security experts believe the piracy attacks are not a problem that should be assigned to naval forces but, rather, a law-enforcement problem that requires action by law-enforcement agencies. In fact, most of the world’s navies have no “rules of engagement” covering piracy incidents and typically release pirates after they have been captured. Only recently, in fact, has the United States itself signed an agreement (with an unnamed country in the Gulf area) to prosecute pirates. After that agreement is ready to be fully implemented, it is expected that the U.S. Navy will change its rules of engagement and permit its ships to pursue and arrest pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

Some shipping industry experts nonetheless believe that the continued attacks on merchant vessels will soon have an adverse worldwide economic impact because of increased insurance costs, the increased operational costs incurring by avoiding certain areas, and higher security costs in general. Meanwhile, because of the major increase in pirate attacks that has occurred in recent year, more than 20 countries already have stationed armed naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden, and have achieved some minor successes in reducing piracy in that area.

However, the naval vessels on the scene report to no central command and/or coordination center. The crews of the Navy ships speak different languages, of course, so a coordinated response is difficult to achieve, which means that most merchant ships and their crews may still have to defend themselves from future attacks. Statistics developed from accounts of previous attacks show, fortunately, that the combination of situational awareness, improved technology, and well trained crew members will help merchant vessels worldwide cope much more successfully in the future with the threat posed by international piracy.

 

By Corey Ranslem

The Department of Homeland Security has been working on a common port-access credential since 2003. That credential — the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) — is a biometric ID card that allows authorized personnel access to the secure and restricted areas of a port, regulated facility, or regulated vessel.

Development of a common-access ID for port workers was required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. The MTSA regulations establish responsibility for the overall program as well as enforcement and application requirements. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was given the authority, and responsibility, both for establishing the program and for the overall enrollment process — including the background checks required and distribution of the TWIC.

The U.S. Coast Guard has the responsibility for enforcement. The over-arching objective of the TWIC program is to improve security in U.S. ports through use of a common ID card and background checks valid for entry into any U.S. port. The TWIC does not automatically grant the user access to any specific port, facility, or vessel. The card holder must have access permission granted from the facility itself or from a vessel security officer.

Unforeseen Delays in Compliance, Implementation
The program was scheduled to be implemented in ports across the United States last summer. However, unforeseen delays pushed the compliance dates into 2009. The first ports actually came online, though – as did enforcement of the program — in late 2008. The majority of ports along the east coast of the United States are now actively participating in the TWIC program — this means that anyone seeking unescorted access to secure areas of those ports must possess the TWIC credentials. If a person seeks access and he or she does not possess a TWIC, that person can be escorted by a TWIC holder.

The Coast Guard has reported that TWIC implementation has continued with very few problems encountered in ports and terminals around the country. Two terminals on the Miami River in Miami, Florida, were closed for a brief period of time, but the problems leading to the closure were quickly resolved.

The TWIC program has met resistance, though, from at least some trucking companies and from the longshoremen’s unions. The Co-Chair of the Longshore Workers Coalition, Leonard Riley, said he is concerned about transportation workers being denied access to the piers they are working. “We are concerned about the implementation of the TWIC program,” he said. “The Longshore workers and truck drivers don’t feel like they have been included as … stake holders in this process. Several people have lost their opportunity to work in the ports because of the TWIC. The Longshore workers feel like they are being treated as terrorists rather than partners.”

TSA officials reported that 34,240 disqualification letters had been issued as of 15 March, but also pointed out that, when the agency’s adjudication process had been completed, there was a total of only 125 final disqualifications. TSA has issued close to one million cards to date and expects that number to double in the next couple of years.

A Broad Range of Mandatory Participants
There are a number of people who will be required to possess a TWIC. Anyone who requires unescorted access to the secure areas of ports and port facilities is required to possess a TWIC. The TWIC program also is expected to have a substantial impact on the recreational boating, yachting, commercial fishing, and diving communities. All credentialed U.S. merchant mariners will be required to obtain a TWIC, whether or not they access a port. The TWIC implementation rules apply to anyone holding a Coast Guard-issued merchant mariners license, merchant mariner document, or certificate of registry. All ship security officers (SSOs) on MTSA-regulated vessels also will be required to obtain TWIC credentials.

There are a number of federal, state, and local agency personnel who are exempt from the TWIC program while they are acting in an official capacity. The largest exemption covers law-enforcement and public-safety agencies, including police departments and fire departments. However, a public-safety employee is not exempt if he or she holds a captain’s license as part of his/her official duties. The full list of exempted personnel and agencies is posted on the TSA website.

More Than a Few Simple Bits of Complexity
Enforcement of the TWIC program is carried out primarily by biometric readers specifically designed to permit law-enforcement and security personnel to positively identify and match the card with the holder. The National Maritime Security Advisory Council (NMSAC), working with TSA, invited key security-technology industry personnel to meet and work with government officials on the TWIC program and help them define the technological requirements for the biometric readers.

The requirements for the TWIC are in fact significantly different from those used for most other proximity-type cards, primarily because the government is dealing with personnel data. The TWIC “isn’t a simple flash-pass,” said Consuelo Bangs, Senior Program Manager at Sagem Morpho Inc. (one of several companies involved in development of the biometric-reader technology). “It has the ability to pass over 27,000 bits of data securely between the card and the reader, while normal proximity cards pass [only] 26 bits of data. Most of the [TWIC] data … [consists of] the security encryption key and digital security that make it almost impossible to counterfeit and pirate information from the card.”

The biometric-reader technology companies are operating in accordance with the federal information processing standard (FIPS) 201. The FIPS 201 standard defines not only how the card and readers are designed but also how the information can be passed between them. There are several pilot study programs ongoing at various ports around the country focusing on, among other things, the effect the TWIC program has on throughput and commerce. There is still a lot of other work continuing with the biometric-reader program. The Coast Guard has not yet set a firm date when the biometric readers will be fully ready, but is continuing to work with the companies already involved in development of the biometric-reader technology.

 

By Corey Ranslem

The port is one of the more challenging – i.e., dangerous — work environments in countries throughout the world. The goal of each port is to move cargo and passengers in and out as efficiently and safely as possible. By their very nature, ports present unique challenges for law-enforcement and fire-rescue agencies from concurrent jurisdictions. Most of the larger ports within the United States have their own internal fire and police departments, but require outside assistance during mass-casualty events or other major disasters. Those critical resources will almost always come from the police and fire departments in cities, towns, and other jurisdictions relatively close to the ports.

Captain James Maes, USCG (Ret.), is the director of Port Services for ABS Consulting. Before working for ABS he was the Coast Guard’s Captain of the Port for Sector Miami and also the director of safety and security for the Port of Miami. He points out that there are three key prerequisites to successfully responding to port incidents: (1) Developing an effective plan; (2) Testing the plan through drills and exercises; and (3) Incorporating into the plan the essential “lessons learned” from the drills and exercises. “Any plan worth having is a plan worth exercising,” Maes comments. “The public-safety agencies, port tenants, and federal agencies all have different plans so it is important to exercise those plans to understand how the separate plans work together.”

An effective emergency-response plan will not necessarily address each and every possible aspect of a particular situation, but it is nonetheless important to have a fairly comprehensive response plan in place to understand how the various agencies from neighboring jurisdictions are going to work together in the event of a true large-scale emergency. “It is also a good idea for the agencies that surround the port to become familiar with the port and maritime environment before an incident,” Maes says. “Training and exercises expose responders to potential situations they may encounter during an incident. The training helps responders understand how to get out of a potentially dangerous situation.”

People and Cargo – a Lethal Mix
Many ports house not only all types of cargo — including hazardous chemicals and fuel – but also handle large numbers of cruise passengers. Port Everglades in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for example — which does handle both hazardous cargo and fuel — is the largest cruise port in the world. “There are a lot of things to consider and understand before responding to an incident in the port,” says Chief Dan Cummings of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office, which is responsible for law enforcement in Port Everglades. Cummings says he must always consider how the law-enforcement actions are going to affect the local community. “We shut the port down for over 12 hours” after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, he recalls. However, gas stations along the Florida Turnpike “were running out of fuel, so we had a find a way to safely get fuel moving again.”

Port Everglades is bordered by three different cities in Broward County — Hollywood, Fort Lauderdale, and Dania Beach. “It is important that we understand the response capabilities of our surrounding agencies,” Cummings points out. For that reason, he continues, “We hold monthly meetings at the port with the surrounding agencies, port tenants, federal agencies, and the port director to discuss what is going on in the port.” The meetings not only help in the planning process, but also serve as “a way for people from the different agencies to get to know each other.”

When there is a port incident that requires help from neighboring response agencies, Cummings must immediately consider not only how to maintain the flow of people and vehicles into and outside of the port but also where to set up a large-scale staging area with a reliable official on the scene to keep track of: (a) what agencies are at the staging area; and (b) the capabilities of those agencies. “We have had incidents in the past,” he points out, “with multiple agencies responding where everyone tries to get as close to the situation as possible and then leaves their vehicles in the way — blocking additional response units and [other] traffic.”

Cummings and Maes agree that multi-agency planning, training, and effective communications are the key to successfully responding to port incidents. “Training helps responders understand how the plans and people are going to work together during an actual situation,” Maes says. “During any incident,” Cummings adds, “it is important to establish good communication with the different responding agencies and also the news media” – which, he points out, serve as “an important link to quickly get information out to the local community.”

Today, fortunately, most U.S. ports have in place, and have exercised, fairly comprehensive response plans that define the roles and capabilities of all of the agencies likely to work with one another in a large-scale incident in and/or affecting the port, but it is still important for the surrounding communities to continue to be involved in planning and training for any future incidents that might occur.

 

A Closer Spirit of Cooperation With Local Agencies
By Corey Ranslem

The Coast Guard faces numerous challenges in protecting the U.S. maritime domain, a task which has always been more difficult than it should be — mostly because the multi-mission service historically has been both under-manned and under-funded. In recent years, though, the funding stream has been both larger and more predictable, giving the service the opportunity to develop closer relationships, and working partnerships, with local and state law-enforcement and fire-rescue response agencies. The principal Coast Guard goal in forging those partnerships is to improve its own maritime domain awareness and response capabilities, with local stakeholders making greater contributions than ever before.

For operational purposes, the Coast Guard’s local Captains of the Port (COTPs) are designated as the primary security coordinators, and on-scene coordinators for security-related incidents, within their respective zones. However, the Coast Guard also relies on the local agencies, more often than ever before, to handle the bulk of the primary response duties.

“The Coast Guard works with local and state agencies on a daily basis to reduce all hazards and threats to the homeland through the maritime sector,” said Commander Brian Gove, the service’s chief of prevention for Sector Miami. “We rely on the local and state agencies to be the eyes and ears on the water because there are numerous local agencies working within a single COTP Port Zone. In some cases the local agencies can respond to incidents much more quickly than the Coast Guard [is able to].”

A Three-Pronged Modernization & Upgrade Program
The Coast Guard is currently going through a long-term service-wide modernization program to improve its command, control, communications, and response capabilities. More specifically, it is continuing to: (a) modernize its cutter and aircraft fleets through what is called the Deepwater program; (b) improve its communications and response capabilities through the Rescue 21 program; and (c) coordinate and expand its overall response capabilities through working relationships with such groups as the Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs).

“The Coast Guard, through the AMSCs, continues to work with local, state, federal, and industry stakeholders to develop risk-management plans … [as well as] business- resumption and continuity plans that … [reduce] maritime risk,” Gove continues. The COTP chairs the local AMSC, but most members of the committee come from local, state, and federal response agencies, port authorities, and local stakeholders, including businessmen.

Local and state agencies, and qualified maritime businesses, are eligible for port-security grant funds to help establish and operate the security programs needed to mitigate risk and improve response capabilities within local port areas. The Coast Guard awarded $388 million in port-security grant funds in fiscal year 2009, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, signed into law earlier this year, provided an additional $150 million in supplemental funding for port security.

The Port Security Grant funds are primarily intended to assist ports in enhancing maritime-domain awareness, according to Gove, but they also are used to develop and improve the risk-management capabilities needed “to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from [terrorist] attacks.” The grant program is expected to be funded at or near the same level next year so that the recent-year improvements in port security, response, and recovery will continue at much the same pace.

Rescue 21 Plus TWICs & Data Fusion = A Full Plate
The previously mentioned Rescue 21 program modernization also will continue to improve the Coast Guard’s ability not only to respond to emergencies but also to enhance the service’s ability to carry out its equally important law-enforcement, marine-safety, environmental-protection, and homeland-security missions. “Rescue 21 has enabled the Coast Guard to determine the location of any VHF transmission that lasts longer than one second,” Gove commented. That capability “significantly reduces the time it takes for our search-and-rescue assets to locate those in distress, greatly increasing the rate of successful rescues,” he continued. “Rescue 21 meets the communication standards that enable the Coast Guard’s interoperability with other federal, state, and local public-safety organizations and improves our command-and-control capabilities.”

The Coast Guard also will continue to work next year, as fast as possible under difficult circumstances, on implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration, 1.4 million people are already enrolled in the TWIC program, and over 1.2 million TWIC’s have been issued. The Coast Guard is working assiduously both on the somewhat complicated TWIC implementation regulations and on an acceptable standard for the biometric readers used in the program to help improve overall port security in general and, more particularly, to control access to sensitive areas of the port such as those where toxic chemicals are loaded or unloaded.

Adding to the USCG’s already full plate of duties and responsibilities is the fact that new “data fusion centers” are rapidly expanding throughout the United States to help improve data and intelligence sharing between and among federal, state, and local law-enforcement and emergency-response agencies. The primary objective of the 70 fusion centers already operational is to share data and analyze intelligence. Because the real goal is to improve the protection of the U.S. homeland, the centers do not focus exclusively on maritime issues but also on many other aspects of homeland security. Like many other agencies, organizations, and operational units formed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the fusion centers were established primarily to provide the intelligence and analyses needed to improve U.S. law-enforcement capabilities in general and thereby protect not only U.S. port and coastal areas but the American homeland as a whole.

The Coast Guard requested $9.95 billion in fiscal year 2010 for its operations and modernization budget. Assuming that all or most of that request is approved, the service’s modernization efforts will undoubtedly continue to improve for the foreseeable future, as will its response and readiness capabilities – but so will the already long list of Coast Guard duties and responsibilities.

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